Cases | State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002) | 2018
The defendant was originally charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child but pled guilty to lewdness involving a child as part of a plea bargain. The juvenile victim’s mother advised the prosecutor that she and her son, M.R., wished to make a statement to the court at the change of plea hearing. The prosecutor did not advise the court of this fact and, although the victim and his mother attended the plea hearing, neither the victim nor his mother addressed the court. The victim and his mother filed two motions to set aside the plea bargain. At the sentencing hearing, the court reopened the change of plea hearing and heard from the victim and his mother regarding the appropriateness of the plea bargain, permitted argument from the victim’s counsel, accepted the victims’ testimony, reaffirmed the defendant’s plea agreement, and denied the victim’s pending motions before sentencing the defendant to eight months in jail. The intermediate court certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court. On appeal, the victim argued that: 1) he had a right to appeal the district court’s adverse rulings on his motions; 2) he had the right to be heard through counsel; 3) he had a right to be heard regarding the appropriateness of the plea bargain; 4) “he properly invoked his right to be heard at defendant’s change of plea hearing by submitting a request to the prosecutor;” and 5) the court denied him his right to be heard. The court held that statutory analysis demonstrates a victim’s right to appeal adverse rulings related to his motions to dismiss the plea bargain. Furthermore, the court held that a “victim’s right to be heard at a plea hearing is triggered where a request has been submitted to the prosecutor handling the case” and that, “prosecutors must ‘assist’ victims in exercising their right to be heard at plea hearings [by forwarding to the judge a victim’s request to be heard] and provide them with ‘clear explanations regarding [such] proceedings.’” Lastly, the court held that “in exercising its power to reopen the plea, the court permitted [the victim] to be heard at a time when he could have persuaded the court to reject the proposed plea . . . [and] reaffirmed the plea only after having accepted [the victim’s] and his mother’s testimony,” and in this way, “cured the error initially committed at the change of plea hearing and honored [the victim’s] right to be heard as soon as it discovered [the victim] wished to be heard.” The decision was affirmed.