Cases | People v. Afentul, 773 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1989) | 2018
Defendant pled guilty to felony-theft and was placed on deferred sentencing with the condition that he pay restitution. Upon defendant’s failure to make payments, the district attorney filed an application for entry of a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence. The court denied the prosecution’s motion and dismissed the felony-theft charge upon finding that defendant lacked financial ability to pay restitution in full while sustaining himself and his teenage daughter. On appeal, the prosecution argued that: (1) defendant’s inability to pay was not a defense to application for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence; and (2) if financial inability constituted a defense, the deferred sentence should be vacated and the case set for trial on the original theft charge. The supreme court held that: (1) the legislature intended that a defendant’s financial ability to pay restitution in full should be an appropriate factor to consider in determining whether a defendant has violated the restitution requirement of a deferred sentence; and (2) Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-403 (repealed) does not require the court to rescind the deferred sentencing agreement and set the matter for trial on the originally filed charges when the court is satisfied that defendant was financially unable to make payments. The court noted that the record supported the trial court’s determination that defendant was financially unable to pay. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering withdrawal of the guilty plea where defendant was under deferred sentencing for a period in excess of the statutory maximum authorized by § 16-7-403.
(This case cites former Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-7-403 and 16-11-204.5.)