People v. Lunsford, 43 P.3d 629 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)

Cases | People v. Lunsford, 43 P.3d 629 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) | 2018

Defendant’s truck rear-ended a stationary van. The van’s occupants, who were husband and wife, were injured. Only the wife was named as a victim in the charging documents. Defendant pled guilty to reckless vehicular assault and driving while ability impaired and was ordered to pay $132,011.67 in restitution to the victims’ insurer. Defendant appealed and the trial court reaffirmed its order. On appeal, defendant claimed that: (1) the husband’s damages were not recoverable in restitution because he was not named as a victim in the charging documents; and (2) noneconomic damages paid by the insurance carrier such as pain and suffering, future inconvenience, future impairment, and future wage loss were speculative and did not constitute actual pecuniary damages for purposes of determining restitution. The appellate court held that: (1) the husband's injuries were recoverable in restitution regardless of whether he was named as a victim in the charging documents. The record supported the trial court's finding that both husband and wife sustained injuries as a result of defendant's conduct; and (2) the insurer was a victim of defendant's criminal conduct entitled to restitution for the amount it paid pursuant to the insurance policy. It was irrelevant that a portion of the insurer’s expenditures were for noneconomic damages sustained by the husband and wife. The only relevant question was whether the expenditures were actual pecuniary damages sustained as a result of the insurer’s contractual relationship with the husband and wife. The appellate court found that the amount of the insurer’s actual pecuniary noneconomic damages was established by the payments it made pursuant to its contractual obligation. The court expressed no opinion as to whether, in a criminal case, the court must determine the amount of noneconomic damages suffered by a victim that are not so established.

(This case cites former Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-204.5.)

1. People v. Martinez, 734 P.2d 650, 1986 Colo. App. LEXIS 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-11-102, 17-2-201 (rest)
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 24 years and ordered that he pay restitution to the victim compensation fund for the victim’s funeral expenses as a condition of parole. On appeal, defendant claimed that the order of restitution was not authorized by law because he was neither conditionally released nor convicted of a crime that specifically provided for imposition of restitution as a part of the sentence. The appellate court discerned the following requirements as being mandated by various pertinent provisions: 1) the trial court was required to impose one year of parole as a part of defendant's sentence; 2) restitution was required as a condition of parole; 3) the amount of such restitution was required to be determined by the court at sentencing; and 4) the sentencing court was required to endorse the restitution amount on the mittimus. The appellate court found that the statutory requirements were complied with and that the sentence was neither erroneous nor illegal. The trial court determined the amount of restitution to be $2,990 and endorsed that amount upon the mittimus. When defendant was eventually released on parole, he would be required as a condition of parole to pay that amount to the victim's family through the local victim compensation fund.